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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
on the basis of evidence indicating the absence of any other cars in the vicinity,
and on an expert's testimony that the nature of the child's injury was such as is
most frequently found to have been caused by contact with an automobile.
The Court cites several cases in support of this decision which involved
injury to adults where no direct evidence was available as to what happened at the
time of the accident;9 the instant case is even stronger in that the plaintiff child
was as a matter of law' 0 incapable of contributory negligence.
Summary Judgment
In Elgar v. Kress & Co.," the defendant moved for summary judgment in
an action brought to enjoin a nuisance caused by defendant's loading operations,
which allegedly interfered with the quiet use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's
premises. The Court, reversing the Appellate Division,' 2 denied the motion on the
ground that the allegations in the complaint raised an issue of fact as to the
nuisance, and that summary judgment could not be granted under these circumstances.
It is well established that the purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of
unmeritorious claims at a pre-trial stage, and may be granted only in the absence
of a genuine issue. 13 Under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice it has been
held'14 that a defendant is entitled to summary judgment, outside of the nine
categories enumerated therin, in any kind of action where his defense is based
on affidavits and on facts established prima facie by documentary evidence or
official record, and the plaintiff fails to show by affidavit facts sufficient to raise
5
an issue as to the verity of such documentary evidence.'
The Court held that the complaint in the case at bar could not be dismissed
on motion, even though it is generally held that normal operations of a loading
platform as an incident of permitted use are not subject to restraint as a nuigance. 16
Since the defense to the nuisance was based solely on affidavits, and was not
supported by any documentary evidence or official record of the kind necessary
9. Scantlebury v. Lehman, 305 N. Y. 713, 112 N. E. 2d 784 (1953); Klein v.
Long LsanZ Ry. Co., 278 App. Div. 980, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 999 (2d Dep't 1951).
10. Verni v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 436, 68 N. E. 2d 431 (1946).
11. 308 N. Y. 533, 127 N. E. 2d 325 (1955).
12. 280 App. Div. 621, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 527 (1st Dep't 1952).
13. Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 505, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922);
Brawer v. Mendelson, 262 N. Y. 53, 186 N. E. 200 (1933).
14. Lederer v. Wise Shoe Go., 276 N. Y. .459, 12 N. E. 2d 544 (1938)..
15. Pross v. Foundation Properties,158 Misc. 304, 285 N. Y. Supp. 796 (1935);
McGreevey v. MeGrevey, 279 App. Div. 705, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 643 (4th Dep't 1951).
16. Gravenhorstv. Zimmerman, 236 N. Y. 22, 139 N. E. 766 (1923); Solof v.
Heitner, 280 App. Div. 937, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 918 (2d Dep't 1952).
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for summary judgment in a non-enumerated action of the type at bar, the decision
seems entirely justified.
JudicialReview of Administrative Decisions
Section 81 of the New York Insurance Law requires the approval of the
Superintendent of Insurance for purchases of real property to be used for business
purposes and not investment. Guardian Life Insurance Company decided to
purchase a new building to be used either as an investment (to be rented as an
office building) or to be used as the company's own principal office building.
Consequently, Guardian sought the Superintendent's approval and was granted a
hearing by the Superintendent, although none is required by law. Guardian had
proceeded with the purchase before the hearing had been granted, and sought in
the courts to have the Superintendents refusal to grant his approval reviewed and
reversed. The courts below denied the review, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 17
Although "in the absence of a clear expression by the Legislature to the
contrary, the courts may review the exercise of a discretionary power vested in an
administrative officer or body to determine whether the case discloses circumstances
which 'leave no possible scope for the reasonable exercise of discretion in such
manner,"' 8 the legislature can proscribe judicial review of certain acts of administrative officers and boards. 19 It is conceded by the mapority that power of review
is always retained by the courts where a Board has exceeded or ignored the
statutory grant of authority.2 0 The dissent here claims that the Superintendent of
Insurance ignored the standard set by the statute; 21 therefore review, in spite of
any possible inferred mandate in the statute, is feasible and necessary. The majority
in interpreting the statutory scheme disregarded the common law power of the
courts to review, though this power has never been relinquished.
17. Guardian Liie Insurance Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N. Y. 174, 124 N. E. 2d
110 (1954).
18. 9chwab v. McElligott, 282 N. Y. 182, 186, 26 N. E. 2d 10 (1940).
19. Millman v. O'Connell, 300 N. Y. 539, 89 N. E. 2d 255 (1949). In this case
§121 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law was Involved; it authorizes judicial
review for some acts, but not for others. It was held that this was a legislative
mandate against judicial review where not specifically authorized. However, §2
of this law provides that the authority's power is "subject only to the right of
judicial review hereinafter provided for"; there is no such deliberate mandatory
phrase in the Insurance Law.
20. Barry v. O'Connell, 303 N. Y. 46, 100 N. E. 2d 127 (1951).
21. According to the dissent, approval should be refused only when the
company's action is clearly unauthorized, or the property is unrelated to the
company's business, or there is fraud or no reasonable business reason for
acquiring the property. Here the Superintendent relied on his own judgment as
to what is a reasonable business use, rather than relying on the business experl.

ence of petitioner's officers.

